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Comments
Richard F. Devlin* We Can't Go On Together with
Suspicious Minds: Judicial Bias
and Racialized Perspective in
R. v. R.D.S.
We recommend that the Chief Justices and Chief Judges of each
court in Nova Scotia exercise leadership within his or her area of
responsibility to ensure fair treatment of visible minorities in the
criminal justice system.
Marshall Report
Perhaps, among some Whites, there is an inherent disquietude when
they see that occasionally Blacks are adjudicating matters pertain-
ing to race relations, and perhaps that anxiety can be eliminated
only by having no Black judges sit on such matters or, if one cannot
escape a Black judge, then by having the latter bend over backwards
to the detriment ofBlack litigants and Black citizens and thus assure
that brand of "impartiality" which some Whites think they deserve.
- Higginbotham J. 2
Introduction
In recent years it has been recognized that the Canadian judiciary has been
drawn from only a relatively small cross section of the community,
specifically privileged white males.3 As a result there have been calls for,
and some action in pursuit of, appointment processes that are designed to
* Associate Professor, Dalhousie Law School, Visiting Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill
University (1995-1996). 1 would like to thank Bruce Archibald, Carol Aylward, Vaughan
Black, Tom Cromwell, Ian Fraser, Olivier Fuldauer, Burnley Jones, Archie Kaiser, Mary Jane
Mossman, Chris Murphy, Dianne Pothier, Stephen Perrot, Rollie Thompson, Natalie Woodbury,
Faye Woodman and an external reviewer, each of whom has contributed to the development
of this comment. Needless to say, they do not necessarily agree with all the arguments.
1. Commissioner's Report: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution
(Halifax: The Commission, 1989) at 190 [hereinafter Marshall Report].
2. Pennsylvania v. Local Union 546, 388 F. Supp. 155 at 177 (1974).
3. C.B.A. The Appointment of Judges in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1985)
at 9, 63; P. Russell and J. Ziegel, "Federal Judicial Appointments: An Appraisal of the First
Mulroney Government's Appointments and the New Judicial Advisory Committees" (1991)
41 U.T.L.J. 4 at 19, 33; C.B.A. Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession,
Touchstones for Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar
Association, 1993) [hereinafter Touchstones].
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diversify the bench in order to render it more inclusive.4 Gender and race
are the two primary categories that are invoked as the benchmarks of
diversity .' While it would appear that numerically there seems to be some
very modest progress towards the goal of achieving a more inclusive
judiciary,6 significant qualitative, institutional and ethical problems
remain. This comment seeks to address two such problems. First, when
we speak of increased "diversity" and greater "inclusion" what do we
mean? Are candidates who are appointed to the bench, at least in part, on
the basis of their race and gender, simply meant to reflect the pluralistic
nature of Canadian society, or are they meant to represent the constitu-
ency from which they emanate? More concretely still, what do "reflect"
or "represent" mean in the context of the judicial role in a contemporary
democracy? Secondly, if it is accepted that racial or gender identity is an
important variable in the appointment process, in what way should that
identity manifest itself as ajudge performs his/her duties on a daily basis?
Specifically, should one's experiences as a person of colour and/or a
woman inform the execution of one's judicial office?
If one is tempted to agree that judges should (or inevitably do) reflect
and represent their identity-based experiences, then one directly encoun-
ters a shibboleth of judicial office: the principle of impartiality. Conven-
tional wisdom holds that judges are to be free of all bias in their decision-
making processes and that if there is even a hint of prejudgment or
partiality the integrity of the judicial system is imperilled: "The judge
should be, and be seen to be, impartial and objective".7 Thus a judge who
explicitly incorporates perspectives into his/herjudicial method that may
reflect the contexts that constitute his/her identity runs the risk of being
accused of one of the most serious allegations of judicial impropriety:
bias.'
Unfortunately, this judicial "dilemma of difference"9 has not yet been
adequately addressed in Canada. The debate seems to have stalled at the
4. S. Martin & K. Mahoney, eds., Equality andJudicialNeutrality (Toronto: Carswell, 1987);
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Appointing Judges: Philosophy, Politics and Practice
(Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991) [hereinafter Appointing Judges]; The
Honourable M. Omatsu, "The Fiction of Judicial Impartiality", forthcoming (1996) C.J.W.L.;
Courts of Justice Statute Law Amendment Act, 1994, S.O. 1994, c. 12, s. 49(2).
5. Appointing Judges, ibid.
6. Touchstones, supra note 3 at 50, 51.
7. Judicial Code of Ethics, adopted pursuant to s. 261 of the Courts of Justice Act (R.S.Q., c.
T-16) O.C. 643-82, 17 March 1982, G.P.Q. 1982 11 1253.
8. R. v. Zundel (No 2.) (1990), 53 C.C.C. (3d) 161 at 198 (Ont. C.A.), rev'd on other grounds
(1992), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (S.C.C.).
9. M. Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990) at 12.
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question of whether or not it is desirable to adopt policies that would
promote greater judicial diversity.'0 But the fact is that some women and/
or people of colour who hold judicial office are already confronting this
dilemma of difference and are paying a heavy toll. Consequently, this
comment attempts to provide a preliminary examination of how this
dilemma can arise, tentatively suggests a possible solution, and high-
lights ideological presumptions and institutionalized barriers that cir-
cumscribe the possibility of achieving anything more than tokenesque
equality. The focus is on a recent Nova Scotian case, R. v. R.D.S.
1. Facts and Record of R. v. R.D.S.
On 2nd December 1994, Corrine Sparks-the only Black " judge in Nova
Scotia-presided over the trial of a Black youth, R.D.S. The charges
against the youth arose out of an alleged altercation between him and a
White police officer, as the latter was attempting to arrest another "non-
white '"1 2 party who, as it turns out, was a cousin of R.D.S."3 The police
officer claimed that R.D.S. ran into him with a bicycle, pushed him and
yelled at him. R.D.S. claimed that when he arrived on the scene, and asked
his cousin what was going on, the police officer threatened to arrest him
10. Appointing Judges, supra note 4.
11. A comment on terminology is essential. The issue of descriptors is fraught with difficulty.
My own view is that while race (in the sense of skin colour) is an important prism of inquiry,
racialization (in the sense of social and cultural forces that construct and encode interactions
and identities) is a more pertinent and problematic terrain of analysis. Consequently, I think that
in the long term it is more useful to develop descriptors based upon ethnic and cultural identity
(e.g., Afro-Canadian) rather than pigmentation (e.g., Black). However, as the facts of this case
specifically involve the latter discourse (especially the very curious "non-white") I will follow
this precedent. The only variation is that pursuant to the Chicago Manual of Style, I will
capitalize the terms Black and White when they refer to racialized groups.
As to my own identity, I am White. What ensues is my interpretation of the significance
of R. v. R.D.S. and is in no way an attempt to speak on behalf of Black communities, or to claim
any particular expertise on issues of race. For a critique of an earlier partial foray on my part
into issues of race in the context of legal education, see C. Aylward, "Adding Colour",
forthcoming C.J.W.L.
As a matter of ethics, it should also be noted that I have exchanged some of my thoughts
with the defence lawyer, as this is a Dalhousie Legal Aid Service case. Also, Sparks J. has been
a student in one of my courses as she is currently enrolled as an LL.M. candidate at Dalhousie
Law School, and I co-ordinate the graduate seminar.
12. According to the trial transcript, the police were in pursuit of what they described as
several "non-white" youths who were believed to be involved in the theft of a vehicle.
13. On November 10th, 1993, R.D.S. was charged with three counts under the Criminal
Code: unlawful assault against a peace officer engaged in the execution of his duty, contrary
to s. 270(1 )(a); unlawful assault against the same peace officer, with intent to prevent the peace
officer from lawfully arresting N.R. (the cousin of R.D.S.), contrary to s. 270(l)(b); and
unlawfully resisting the same peace officer who was engaged in the lawful execution of his
duty, contrary to s. 129(a).
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and then put him in a choke hold. The youth denied striking the police
officer. Apart from the police officer and the accused, no witnesses were
called either by the Crown or the defence, thus everything turned on the
credibility of the testimony of the police officer and R.D.S. At the end of
the trial, which lasted about two hours, Judge Sparks delivered an oral
decision acquitting the youth. The transcript of the decision reads as
follows:
In my view, in accepting the evidence, and I don't say that I accept
everything that Mr. S. has said in Court today, but certainly he has raised
a doubt in my mind and, therefore, based upon the evidentiary burden,
which is squarely placed upon the Crown, that they must prove all the
elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, I have queries in my
mind with respect to what actually transpired on the afternoon of October
the 17th.14
Had Sparks J. concluded her reasons at this point, R.D.S.#1 would
probably 5 have remained an uncontroversial case. However, she contin-
ued:
The Crown says, well, why would the officer say that events occurred
the way in which he has relayed them to the Court this morning. I'm not
saying that the constable has misled the Court, although police officers
have been known to do that in the past. And I'm not saying that the officer
overreacted, but certainly police officers do overreact, particularly when
they're dealing with non-white groups. That, to me, indicates a state of
mind right there that is questionable.
I believe that probably the situation in this particular case is the case of
a young police officer who overreacted. And I do accept the evidence of
Mr. S. that he was told to shut up or he would be under arrest. That seems
to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day. 6
The police officer was disturbed by these statements and complained
to his union and the police chief. 7 A local newspaper was contacted. The
Halifax Chronicle Herald sought to get access to tapes of the transcript
of the trial. However, on 16 December 1994, in a carefully crafted
decision,' Sparks J. refused to grant access on the ground that this was
14. R. v. R.D.S., Y093-168, (2 December 1994) at 68 [hereinafter R.D.S. #1].
15. I say "probably" because conversations with one person who was in attendance at the trial
suggest that both the police officer and the Crown lawyer did not appear to be comfortable with
the unprecendently large number of Black court officials: the judge, the defence lawyer and the
court reporter.
16. R.D.S. #1, supra note 14 at 68-69.
17. B. Dorey, "Cop Complains about Judges Remarks" The [Halifax] Mail-Star (9 December
1994) A3; B. Dorey, "Paper Denied Access to Court Tape" The [Halifax] Mail-Star (17
December 1994) A3.
18. R. v. R.D.S., F.H. No. Y093-168, Ruling Dec. 7th 1994 [hereinafter R.D.S. #2J.
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a young offender case and that the transcript was protected under s. 38(1)
of the Young Offenders Act.I9
Two distinct notices of appeal were filed on 22 December, the last
working day before the Christmas vacation. In the first, the Crown
appealed on the basis that Judge Sparks's decision manifested both actual
and apparent bias in favour of the accused and against the police officer
on the basis of their race. In the second, the Chronicle Herald newspaper
and the C.B.C. argued that once the decision was rendered the transcript
became part of the public record. Simultaneously, the Halifax Police
Chief publicly complained about the racial bias of Sparks J. and wrote a
"letter of concern" to Chief Family Court Judge Ferguson.20 On 13
January 1995 Judge Sparks filed supplementary reasons in support of her
decision to acquit R.D.S.21
The two appeals were heard in April 1995. Both were allowed.22 Chief
Justice Glube dealt with the appeal on the issue of bias,23 and Palmeter
A.C.J. dealt with the appeal on the issue of publicity. 24 While there may
be some debate as to the correctness of Palmeter J.'s decision, for the
purposes of this comment I wish to focus on the decision of Chief Justice
Glube. First, Glube C.J. held that the supplementary reasons issued by
Judge Sparks on the 13th January 1995 were "gratuitous". Specifically,
she pointed out that Sparks J. made comments on "the demeanour of the
police officer which were not contained in the original decision" and
made "a specific reference to outside material which was not contained
in the original decision. '25 These materials were the Marshall Report.
Consequently, Glube C.J. refused to consider the supplementary reasons.
Secondly, Glube C.J. directly addressed the issue of bias. Having very
briefly invoked one precedent on bias, 26 she opined that "[f]undamental
justice requires impartial decision-makers, and includes natural justice
and a duty to act fairly". 27 Several lines later she continued:
19. R.S.C. 1985, c. Y-1.
20. E. Hoare & B. Dorey, "Top Cop Considers Action Against Judge", The [Halifax] Mail
Star (10 December 1994) A4; E. Hoare, "Halifax Police Chief to Complain about remarks from
Judge", The [Halifax] Chronicle Herald (13 December 1994) A7; B. Dorey, "Matter of Judge's
Remarks Dropped" The [Halifax] Mail-Star (9 May 1995) A7.
21. F.H. No. 8093-168, Supplementary Reasons [hereinafter R.D.S. #3].
22. It is to be noted, for the sake of completeness, that once the two appeals were successful,
the police chief withdrew the threat of filing a complaint.
23. R. v. R.D.S., S.C.N.S. SH #112402 (18 April 1995) [hereinafter R.D.S. #4].
24. R. v. R.D.S. (re Halifax Herald Ltd.), [1995] N.S.J. 207 (S.C.).
25. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 4-5.
26. Pearlman v. Manitoba Law Society, [199112 S.C.R. 869. This is a curious precedent as
it deals with an allegation, in an administrative context, of financial interest.
27. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 8.
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There is certainly nothing in the transcript of the actual evidence which
was heard on December 2nd to suggest any bias or apprehension of bias,
but when I turn to the decision rendered the same day ... it contains a
thorough review of the facts and a finding based upon credibility in favour
of the accused. Had the decision ended there... [where Sparks J. addresses
the question of the evidentiary burden.j there would have been no basis for
this appeal as the Crown has already conceded. Unfortunately, the decision
did not. The Learned Trial Judge went on to add two more paragraphs....
[cited previously]
On a thorough review of the transcript, I find no basis for these remarks
in the evidence. There was no evidence before the trial court as to the
"prevalent attitude of the day" or otherwise the remarks made relating to
the police. With great respect, judges must be extremely careful to avoid
expressing views which do not form part of the evidence.
The test of apprehension of bias is an objective one, that is, whether a
reasonable right-minded person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In
my respectful opinion, in spite of the thorough review of the facts and the
finding on credibility, the two paragraphs at the end of the decision lead to
the conclusion that a reasonable apprehension of bias exists.
Having found that, I need go no further as such a finding requires that
a new trial be ordered....
In conclusion, the appeal is allowed and a new trial is ordered in front
of a different trial judge.28
The decisions rendered by Sparks J. and Glube C.J. raise several
important questions which bring the dilemma of difference in the judicial
context into sharp relief. What exactly did Youth Court Judge Sparks and
Glube C.J. say? What is the nature and scope of the law on judicial bias?
Specifically, in the context of the "reasonable apprehension of bias" test,
what, precisely, is the appropriate test to apply and who is the prototypical
reasonable person? Are there any precedents for finding judicial bias on
the basis of race, and if not might it be the case that Judge Sparks has been
subjected to a double standard? Could it be argued that Sparks J.'s
comments on police officers misleading the court was simply an express
rejection of a presumption of police infallibility, and that her comments
on police officers' negative attitudes towards Black youth were simply
the manifestation of a contextual judicial method? More broadly, what
exactly do we mean by bias, impartiality and fairness in the context of
judicial decision-making and what are the attributes of good judging in
contemporary society? Closely related is the question of whether judges
should be "colourblind" or whether they have the responsibility to factor
in social variables such as race where appropriate. Finally, there is the
issue of the possible impact of this decision on: (a) the accused; (b) the
28. Ibid. at 8-10.
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Black community; (c) the judicial community, and (d) Judge Sparks. The
remaining sections of this comment address each of these questions.
II. What Was Said?
Before proceeding with a substantive analysis of the decisions in this
case, it should be noted that neither judge was as clear as she might have
been in giving her reasons. Fairness therefore requires that I identify
ambiguities that pervade the reasoning of both Sparks J. and Glube C.J.
and that I be explicit about my interpretation of their statements.
Trial judges have a heavy workload that allows little time for meticu-
lously thought-through reasoning. This is particularly true when deci-
sions are delivered orally immediately after counsel have finished their
arguments. Judge Sparks's decision, unfortunately, has some ambigu-
ities and apparent contradictions that need to be resolved. When we
analyze the two paragraphs in question, there is little problem with her
statements on the ultimate burden of proof: the Crown failed to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt. 29 The next paragraph does, however,
cause some problems. In response to the Crown's proposition that there
could be no conceivable reason for the police officer to say anything at
variance with the truth of what happened, as I read Judge Sparks, she
makes two points. First, she appears to be suggesting that there should be
no automatic judicial assumption as to the accuracy of a police officer's
interpretation of events, because sometimes officers (like any other group
of witnesses) may mislead the court. She is careful to add, however, that
she is not claiming that this particular officer misled the court.3° I
understand her use of "mislead" to be in the sense of deliberate misrep-
resentation, which is different from saying that the officer's account may
reflect his own good-faith, but necessarily subjective, interpretation of
events. Second, Sparks J. points out that police officers cannot be
presumed to be absolutely virtuous, for sometimes they overreact in
moments of stress, and that this can happen particularly when they are
dealing with "non-white" groups.31 She does add, however, that she is not
saying that the particular officer in this case overreacted on the basis of
race.32 As I shall suggest in Part V, neither of these propositions can be
seriously questioned.
29. R.D.S. #1, supra note 14 at 68. I attach the qualifier "little" because an argument could
be made that, as phrased, Judge Sparks's comments may confuse the "legal burden" with the
"evidential burden". For an overview of this distinction see J. Sopinka, The Law of Evidence
in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1992) c. 3.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid. at 68-69.
32. Ibid. at 69.
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Slightly more problematic is the next sentence-"That, to me, indi-
cates a state of mind right there that is questionable." 33-because it is not
clear what the "that" refers to, nor what she means by "a state of mind".
As I read this sentence, it only makes sense in the context of the Crown's
contention that there could be no possible reason why the police officer
would misrepresent the situation. Judge Sparks's point appears to be that
in a racially stratified society there are indications that police officers are
not always credible or neutral, and that this reality is part of a background
knowledge that a judge should not ignore.
The next sentence continues to complicate the picture because, in
apparent contradiction to what she had said three lines previously, Judge
Sparks explicitly states that "probably... [the] young police officer...
overreacted."34 She supports this determination of fact by expressly
accepting the evidence of the accused that "he was told to shut up or he
would be under arrest."35 However, the following statement-"that
seems to be in keeping with the prevalent attitude of the day." 36 -may be
unclear. Once again the antecedent to which the "that" refers is ambigu-
ous: it could mean that Judge Sparks believes that most people would
believe that a police officer might tell a Black youth to shut up or face
arrest; or, it could mean that the police officer's aggressive response to
R.D.S. was an articulation of a common racially prejudiced attitude in
Canada towards Black youths. Either way, the comment seems to suggest
that police officers may be racially influenced in their attitudes towards,
and conduct in relation to, "non-whites".
To summarize, as I interpret her decision Judge Sparks seems to have
said two things: first, that sometimes police officers may mislead the
court, and secondly, that sometimes White police officers are racially
influenced in their interactions with Black citizens.
Glube C.J.'s appeal decision was also delivered orally. Like Sparks
J.'s decision, it is inelegant, and somewhat unclear at certain key points.
This is unfortunate given the importance of the issues. In particular, one
sentence needs to be highlighted-"There is no evidence before the trial
court as to 'the prevalent attitude of the day' or otherwise the remarks
relating to the police. "37-because, though crucial, it is ambiguous.
33. Ibid.
34. Ibid. My colleague, Professor Pothier, has suggested that the statements may not be quite
as contradictory as I suggest. She argues that in the first reference, Sparks J. is indicating that
she cannot say for sure that the police officer overreacted, and that in the second reference she
is simply indicating that he probably did.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 10.
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Clearly the gist of the claim is that because no evidence was tendered at
trial about prevalent attitudes or public opinion then a judge should not
conjecture as to those matters. This, as we shall see in Part V, is debatable.
But the point of Glube C.J.'s "or otherwise the remarks" reference is
unclear. My sense is that Glube C.J. is referring to Judge Sparks's
suggestion that police officers may overreact when dealing with "non-
white" groups. Glube C.J.'s purpose, I think, is to indicate that the judicial
articulation of such a viewpoint gives rise to a reasonable apprehension
of bias because the judge can be perceived as either being hostile to
(White) police officers, or favouring of "non-whites", or both. For Glube
C.J. this is enough. Consequently, no further analysis is required and the
only remedy is to order a new trial.
To be clear, although Glube C.J. never explicitly states that her finding
of an apprehension of bias is related to race there can be little doubt that
this is the case. Racial bias, both actual and apparent, was vigorously
argued by the Crown lawyer and Glube C.J.'s own decision, as we have
seen, primarily focussed on Sparks J.'s remarks which clearly factored in
the issue of race.
Having attempted to clarify what was said by both Judge Sparks and
Chief Justice Glube, I can now provide an interpretation of the signifi-
cance of these statements. As a preliminary step it will be helpful to locate
this case in the context of the common law of judicial bias.
III. The Law of Judicial Bias
The law of judicial bias in Canada is both indeterminate and underdevel-
oped. For the purpose of this comment several points may be worth
noting. First, conventionally there are said to be two possible grounds for
a claim of judicial bias: (a) real or actual bias; or (b) situations giving rise
to "a reasonable apprehension of bias".38 Second, a determination of
whether actual or apprehended bias exists will depend upon the facts of
each case.39 Third, actual bias is very rarely argued' and almost never
succeeds, therefore the vast majority of cases deal with the issue of
"reasonable apprehension of bias". 4'
38. R.M. Sedgewick Jr., "Disqualification on the Ground of Bias as Applied to Administra-
tive Tribunals" (1945) 23 Can. Bar Rev. 453.
39. Pearlman, supra note 26 at 885; Ruffo v. Counseil de la Magistrature (1992), 98 D.L.R.
(4th) 176 at 182 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal granted 4 February 1993, [1993] 1 S.C.R. ix.
40. But see R. v. Zundel (No. 2), supra note 8.
41. See e.g. R. v. Bertram, [1989] O.J. No. 2123 (H.C.J.) (QL); R. v. Lacombe, [1986] O.J.
No. 328 (S.C.) (QL).
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Fourth, concerns about an apprehension of bias are fairly common in
the criminal trial context.42 Usually, they are expressed as concerns about
a judge's negative attitude or conduct in relation to an accused.43 Occa-
sionally, they are raised in the context of a judge's comments on the
performance of the accused's counsel,44 and infrequently on the basis of
a judge's relationship with the Crown. 45 Moreover, and importantly for
the purposes of this case, it should be noted that only very rarely does the
Crown claim an apprehension of judicial bias.46
Fifth, although the rhetoric of the case law appears to put a very high
premium on justice "manifestly be[ing] seen to be done",47 a comprehen-
sive analysis of the case law suggests that in the vast majority of the cases
concerns about an apprehension of bias are dismissed. This can be
explained because:
a) there is a "presumption of regularity", based on the maxim omnia
praesumuntur rite esse acta;48
b) there is an implicit counterprinciple that assumes good faith and
impartiality on the part of judges,49 sometimes giving rise to a
perception that there is a "duty to sit";50
c) a suggestion of actual or reasonable apprehension of bias is
frequently not well received by either the judge in question or the
42. See e.g. R. v. Brouillard, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 39.
43. R. v. Gerlach, [1994] OJ. No. 1236 (Gen. Div.) (QL); R. v. Lacombe, [] 9861 O.J. No. 328
(S.C.) (QL).; R. v. OrdExparte Churly, [1971] 1 O.R. 641 (H.C.J.); R. v. R.A.B. (1990), 67
Man. R. (2d) 258 (C.A.); R. v. Teskey, (1995) 28 Alta. L.R. (3d) 196 (Q.B.).
44. R. v. Stark, [1994] O.J. No. 406 (Gen. Div.) (QL); R. v. Maxemiuk (1994), 122 Sask. R.
223 (Q.B.).
45. R. v. Rowbotham (1988), 41 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Smith and Whiteway
Fisheries (1994), 133 N.S.R. (2d) 50 (C.A.).
46. See e.g. R. v. Gushman, [1994] O.J. No. 813 (Gen. Div.) (QL); Re Ramsey (1972), 8
C.C.C. (2d) 188 (N.B.C.A.).
47. R. v. Sussex Justices, Exparte McCarthy, [1923] All E.R. Rep. 233 at 234 (C.A.).
48. G.W.L. Properties v. Grace, [1992] B.C.J. No. 2828 at para. 13 (C.A.) (QL); R. v.
Osachuk (1995), 127 Sask. R. 21 at 33 (Q.B.). See also Re E.A. Manning Ltd. and Ontario
Securities Commission, [1995] 23 O.R. (3d) 257 at 267 (C.A.).
49. As phrased by Blackstone, "The law will not suppose a possibility of bias in ajudge, who
is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that
presumption and idea." W. Blackstone, Commentaries On the Laws of England III (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1788) at 361. See also R. v. Lippi (1991), 64 C.C.C. (3d) 513 at 540; Ruffo, supra
note 39 at 202; LeBlanc v. LeBlanc (1993), 85 Man. R. (2d) 278 (C.A.); Phillips v. Nova Scotia
(Commission of Inquiry into the Westray Mine Tragedy), [ 1995] 2 S.C.R. 97.
50. R. v. Holmes, [1989] M.J. No. 413 (Prov. Ct.) (QL); Middlekanp v. Fraser Valley Real
Estate Board, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2965 at para. 26 (S.C.) (QL); R. v. Zborovsky, [ 1992] O.J. No.
1861 (Prov. Div.) (QL).
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appellate court,5 and therefore, lawyers are cautious of advancing
such an argument;52
d) the burden of proof is upon the party alleging either actual or
reasonable apprehension of bias;53
e) the standard of proof upon the party alleging a reasonable appre-
hension of bias is, in reality, quite high.54
This last point on the issue of the standard of proof merits further
elaboration. It is widely acknowledged that the test for determining
whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias is an "objective" one,
that is, it is not whether a judge subjectively would believe that his/her
conduct or words might be biased, but whether a reasonable person would
find these to be indicative of a probable bias.55 The case law in Canada
almost always invokes the standard outlined by de Grandpr6 J. (dissent-
ing) in the administrative law case of Committee for Justice v. National
Energy Board:
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining
thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that
test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically
and practically-and having thought the matter through-conclude. Would
he think that it is more likely than not that Mr. Crowe, whether consciously
or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. '5 6
For the purposes of this comment two points are worth noting about this
test: the attributes and identity of the "reasonable person", and whether
that person's perception of bias rests upon a possibility or probability test.
Although central to much common law legal thought,5 the reasonable
person test is problematic. While the case law tells us that s/he should be
informed, thoughtful and right minded, in the end the reasonable person
51. R. v. Zundel (No. 2), supra note 8 at 207; R. v. Mohan (1994), 162 A.R. 6 (C.A.); G.W.L.
Properties, supra note 48 at paras. 13, 18; R. v. Stark, [1994] O.J. No. 406 at para. 25 (Gen.
Div.) (QL).
52. R. v. T. (R.T.J.), [1989] N.S.J. No. 223 (S.C.) (QL), Nathanson J.
53. "Bias, however, is easily alleged by a disgruntled litigant. The successful party has rights
too. A decision cannot be overturned merely because one party apprehends bias. The facts must
also show that party's apprehension to be reasonable." Leblanc v. Leblanc, supra note 49.
54. For example, in Ruffo, neither passion, vigour nor even aggressiveness were considered
to generate concerns about a reasonable apprehension of bias. "Obvious hostility" appeared to
be the benchmark. Supra note 39 at 196-97.
55. Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) v. Lannon, [1969] 1 Q.B. 577 at 599 (C.A.),
Denning M.R.
56. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 370 at 394.
57. Its origins can be traced to Vaughan v. Menlove (1837), 3 Bing. N.C. 467, 132 E.R. 490
(C.P.) with the invocation of "the man of ordinary prudence".
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is a fictional abstraction. 8 Throughout the case law on judicial bias the
reasonable person is assumed to be without age, gender, or race. But this
universal figure is like no one we know or can recognize. Increasingly, in
other common law doctrines the courts are beginning to recognize this
reality and are slowly beginning to locate the reasonable person in the
experiential contexts from which we all inevitably emerge. For example,
in relation to the defence of provocation, both the Supreme Court and the
House of Lords have acknowledged that age is an important element in
setting the standard for a "reasonable person" where the accused is a boy
in his mid-teens who killed an older man who had sexually assaulted
him.59 Indeed, in various dicta, Lord Diplock has suggested that gender
and race might also be pertinent variables, though he did not develop the
point.' Moreover, in the last decade many women scholars have pointed
out that in effect we have had the reasonable man test and that it implicitly
relies upon male experiences and perceptions. 6' Most significantly, in the
case of R. v. Lavallee,62 the Supreme Court of Canada accepted such an
analysis in the context of the law of self defence and acknowledged that
the reasonable woman is not necessarily in the same situation as the
reasonable man and that the law should acknowledge these existential
and experiential differences.63
If we recognize that the reasonable person test is cognizant of age and
gender differences, might it also be possible for it to be responsive to
racialized difference? In other words, historically has the reasonable
person--"the man on the Clapham omnibus"-been implicitly "White",
58. Y.M. Morrisette, "The Exclusion of Evidence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do" (1984) 29 McGill L.J. 523 at 538.
59. R. v. Hill (1986), 51 C.R. (3d) 97 (S.C.C.); D.P.P. v. Camplin, [1978] 2 All E.R. 127
(H.L.).
60. Camplin, ibid. at 174.
61. See, for example, H. Allen, "One Law for All Reasonable Persons?" (1988) 16 Int'l J. Soc.
L. 419; N. Ehrenreich, "Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonableness
in Sexual Harassment Law" (1990) 99 Yale L.J. 1177; L. Finley, "A Break in the Silence:
Including Women's Issues in a Torts Course" (1989) 1 Yale J.L. & Fem. 41; C. Forell,
"Essentialism, Empathy and the Reasonable Woman" (1994) U. III. L. Rev. 771; C. Sanger,
"The Reasonable Woman and the Ordinary Man" (1992) 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1411.
62. [199014 W.W.R. 1.
63. See also Egan v. Canada (1995), 124 D.L.R. (4th) 609 at 633,676-77 (S.C.C.) Cory and
L'Heureux-Dub6 JJ., dissenting on other grounds. It might be argued that this contextualist
approach to the reasonable person test has been qualified by R. v. Creighton (1993), 23 C.R.
(4th) 189 (S.C.C.) by a slim 5-4 majority. However, the significance of this case for
determining the characteristics of the reasonable person, and in particular Lavallee, supra
note 62, has been subject to quite contradictory academic interpretations. See, for example,
"Criminal Reports Forum: Objective Fault in the Supreme Court" (1993), 23 C.R. (4th)
240-79.
64. Hall v. Brooklands Club (1933), 1 K.B. 205 at 224.
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and has the time now come for Canadian law to recognize not just the
multicultural but also the racialized nature of Canadian society? Thus I
would suggest that while the reasonable person test is still a useful legal
device in that it is not desirable to retreat to hypersensitive subjectivity,
on occasion it will be necessary to consider whether race may be a
relevant variable in determining the reasonableness of that person's
perception. 65 And, in my opinion, R.D.S. is one such case. Specifically,
when a judge suggests that racial identity may influence relations
between a White police officer and a Black youth, is the person who might
apprehend a possible bias assumed to be a person of colour or White?66
Might it be that while we are all members of Canadian society, we see that
society in racially informed ways, and that what may appear to be bias to
one person may in fact appear to be an incontrovertible reality to another?
I will return to the issue of different perceptions of police-Black relations
in Part V. My only point here is that bias may be in the eye of the beholder,
and that if (as the House of Lords has acknowledged) the reasonable
person is but the Court's "anthropomorphic conception of justice 67 then
65. See also, D. Greene, "Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the
Myth of Colorless Individualism inBostick v. Florida" (1993) 67 Tulane L. Rev. 1979 at 2038-
43; R. Ward, "Consenting to Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighbourhoods: No
Place for a 'Reasonable Person"' (1993) 36 Howard L.J. 239.
66. This proposal to further contextualize the reasonable person is not unprecedented. For
example, in 1956 the Supreme Court of the Northern Territories of Australia rejected an
argument that the reasonable person standard was different for White persons and Aboriginal
persons, but it did permit the jury to consider evidence on what a reasonable person who had
experienced the world as an Aboriginal would have concluded:
[Tihe general principle of law is to create a standard which would be observed by the
average person in the community in which the accused person lives. It is clear from the
cases decided . . .that in White communities .. .the standard is not a fixed and
unchanging standard; it leaves it open.., to regard the ... tribe as separate community
for purposes of considering the reaction of the average man ... [i]f... the average
reasonable person in his community [would have so reacted].
R. v. Muddarubba (1956), N.T.J. 317 at 322. Moreover, in the American Supreme Court at least
two cases have acknowledged that race may be a relevant variable where considering "police-
minority relations". See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) and U.S. v. Mendentall, 446 U.S. 544
at 558 (1980), U.S. Reh. Den. 448 U.S. 908. Moreover, in the context of hostile environment
litigation at least two U.S. courts have accepted that the appropriate perspectival standard is that
of a "reasonable Black person" when addressing harassment against a Black male, or "the
reasonable person of the same gender and race or color" when dealing with harassment against
a Black female. See Harris v. International Paper, 765 F. Supp. 1509 at 1516 (1991) and
Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 424 at 428-29 (1992).
67. Davis Contractors Ltd. v. Fareham Urban District Council, [1956] A.C. 696 at 728
(H.L.) Lord Radcliffe. See also R. v. Gough, [1992] 2 All E.R. 724 at 735 (H.L.); Glasgow
Corporation v. Muir, [1943] A.C. 48 at 457, Lord MacMillan; Froom v. Butcher, [1975] 3 All
E.R. 520 at 526-526 (C.A.), Lord Denning M.R.; and R. v. Collins (1987), 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1
at 18 (S.C.C.), where Lamer J. (as he then was) grudgingly acknowledged the necessary
subjectivity of the reasonable person.
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it may be appropriate to inquire into the racial identity and experiential
context of the judge who finds that there is a reasonable apprehension of
bias based on race.65
Even when we recognize that the reasonable person is really the
judge's jurisprudential alter ego, there still remains another aspect of the
test, that is, the issue of the intensity of this person's apprehension of bias.
As Watt J. has recently argued:
Fundamental to the test applied in cases where a reasonable apprehen-
sion of bias is alleged are two objective standards or elements. A standard
of reasonableness is applied, not only to the observer, but also to what is
observed. The observer, the person by whom bias must be apprehended,
must be a reasonable person whom the law invests with knowledge of the
circumstances which are said to give rise to the apprehension of bias.
Further, the apprehension of bias must itself be reasonable from what is
observed. In other words, it must be a reasonable apprehension, not one
which is fanciful, imaginary, illusory or conjectural.69
However, reasonable apprehension, like the reasonable person, is a rather
indeterminate standard and the case law suggests two possible variations:
a "possibility" and a "probability" test for bias.
A possibility test establishes a relatively low threshold for finding an
apprehension of bias. Its clearest articulation is to be found in R. v. Sussex
Justices when Lord Hewett postulated that "the rule is that nothing is to
be done which so much as creates even a suspicion that there has been an
improper interference with the course of justice."7 In essence, this
"suspicious mind" test asks whether a reasonable person might appre-
hend bias.71 Consequently, it has the potential to cover a wide range of
judicial conduct.
However, another line of cases invokes a higher threshold and adopts
a probability test: would a reasonable person apprehend a real likelihood
of bias? In the English context this probability or real likelihood test can
be traced back toR. v. Rand,72 and was explicitly preferred over the looser
possibility test in the carefully reasoned decision of R. v. Cambourne
68. In a recent report prepared for the Canadian Judicial Council, Professor Friedland has
argued that a judge has "enormous discretion ... in using the test of whether a reasonable well-
informed observer would have an apprehension of bias.... The reasonable, well-informed
person seems to be the judge deciding the case." M. Friedland, A Place Apart Judicial
Independence andAccountability in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995) at 18.
69. R. v. Gushman, supra note 46 at para. 31 [emphasis added].
70. [1924] 1 K.B. 256 at 258. Similar dicta are to be found in R. v. Essex Justices, [1927] 2
K.B. 475 and R. v. Campbell (1981), 49 N.S.R. (2d) 307 at 317-18 (C.A.).
71. Hon. R. Kimball, "Judicial Misbehaviour and R. v. Sussex Justices" (1994) 18(1) Prov.
Judges J. 11.
72. [18661 L.R. I Q.B. 230 at 233.
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Justices exparte Pearce.73 Indeed in one of the most oft-cited precedents
in this area, Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.C.G.) v. Lannon,74 Lord
Denning opined:
there must appear to be a real likelihood of bias. Surmise or conjecture is
not enough.... There must be circumstances from which a reasonable
man would think it likely or probable that the justice or chairman as the
case may be would or did, favour one side unfairly at the expense of the
other.
Finally, in England this debate has been resolved by a recent decision of
the House of Lords, which has, after an extensive review of the two
competing lines of authority, determined that the appropriate test is that
of a "real danger". 75
Similarly, in the Canadian context, in Committee for Justice, de
Grandpr6 J. has argued that "[tihe grounds for this apprehension must...
be substantial" and explicitly rejected the standard of a "very sensitive or
scrupulous conscience" .76 He was joined by Laskin C.J. who also rejected
the standard of "an uneasy suspicion". 77 Moreover, in a very recent and
quite thorough review of the pertinent case law, Nash J., of the Alberta
Queen's Bench, extracted the following principle: "[t]he test is whether
there exists a real likelihood of bias-mere suspicion is not enough." 78
However, despite the fact that the dominant trend is in favour of a
probability test for the apprehension, as I will argue in the next section,
Glube C.J. seems to adopt a possibility threshold.
IV. Case Law on Racial Bias: A Double Standard?
In light of the foregoing comments, it is important to note that in a review
of case law on judicial bias in Canada, I have not turned up one decision
where there has been found to be racially grounded judicial bias, either
real or apprehended. Two explanations may be offered. First, it could be
suggested that in the several hundred years that White people have been
in what is now called Canada, judges have been extremely sensitive to
issues of racial inequality and that, unlike many Canadians, they have
risen above racial prejudice. Alternatively, it might be argued that "non-
white" groups have been either so subordinated to, or marginalized from,
73. [19541 2 All. E.R. 850 at 855 (Q.B.).
74. [1968] 3 All. E.R. 304 at 310 (C.A.).
75. R. v. Gough, supra note 67.
76. Committee for Justice, supra note 56 at 395.
77. Ibid. at 386 concurring with dicta from the Federal Court of Appeal.
78. R. v. Teskey, [ 1995] A.J. No. 142 (Q.B.) (Q.L.). See also R. v. Bain (1992), 69 C.C.C. (3d)
481 (S.C.C.); Adams v. Workers Compensation Board (1989), 42 B.C.L.R. (2d) 228 (C.A.);
G.W.L. Properties, supra note 48 at para. 13; R. v. Walker, [1968] 3 C.C.C. 254 (Alta. CA.).
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the Canadian legal system that it has been unreceptive to their experi-
ences, perceptions, concerns or complaints. In other words, the issue of
race has been a non-question in the law of judicial bias. 79 Given the
findings of several recent commissions 8° it would appear that the former
explanation is indefensible and, therefore, I would suggest that the latter
is the more likely explanation. But no matter which of these two
explanations is adopted, surely it is significant that the first Canadian case
where there is a finding of an apprehension of racial bias is in relation to
statements made by a Black judge.
By way of comparison, it may be fruitful to briefly consider two recent
situations where racial bias was alleged, but not found. The first stems
from the Donald Marshall Jr. saga. The second involved Territorial Court
Judge R.M. Bourassa of the Northwest Territories.8' After the publication
of the Marshall Report 2 the Attorney General of Nova Scotia requested
the Canadian Judicial Council to hold an inquiry into the conduct of the
Reference Court and to consider whether there were grounds to remove
the five appellate judges from office. Even though members of the Court
of Appeal seemed to be quite hostile to Mr. Marshall and had stated that
"any miscarriage of justice was more apparent than real"83 the Inquiry,
while critical of "the grossly inappropriate language", 84 ultimately deter-
mined that such statements did not impugn the impartiality of the court.85
An equally high threshold for a finding of bias has been applied in the
Bourassa Inquiry.
Bourassa J. was widely criticized for both racism and sexism because
of certain statements he allegedly made during an interview, and because
79. J. McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile" in A. Miles & A. Finn, Feminism
in Canada: From Pressure to Politics (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) at 27.
80. See e.g. S. Lewis, Letter to Bob Rae, Premier ofOntario, Outlining the Recommendations
to Improve Race Relations in Ontario (Toronto: Government of Ontario, 1992); Cawsey
Report, Justice on Trial: Report of the Task Force on the CriminalJustice System and its Impact
on the Indian and M~tis People of Alberta (Edmonton: Task Force, 1991); Marshall Report,
supra note 1.
81. There is one other case where a judge's decision was appealed because of negative
comments he made in the context of a case involving Pakistani immigrants. The British
Columbia Court of Appeal found, however, that the comments would not generate an
apprehension of bias. Pirbhai Estate v. Pirbhai (1988), 70 C.B.R.(N.S.) 175 (B.C.S.C.).
82. Supra note I.
83. R. v. Marshall (1983), 57 N.S.R. (2d) 286 at 287 (C.A.).
84. "Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant
to subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia"
(1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 210 at 220.
85. Ibid. at 222. It might be worth noting that the Inquiry was extremely deferential to several
other statements made by the Court of Appeal justices in relation to Mr, Marshall arguing that
"in making findings of credibility, the court was within its jurisdiction". Ibid. at 220.
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of a sentence he imposed in a sexual assault case (R. v. A 86 ) which, some
argued, was egregiously low because the accused was a prominent
member of the community. I will briefly review the findings of a judicial
inquiry constituted to determine whether Judge Bourassa should be
dismissed because of unfitness and misbehaviour and the Appeal Court
decision in the sentencing case. My purpose is to identify how the issue
of bias has been dealt with in these contexts in order to inquire whether
a different (double) standard has been applied to Judge Sparks.
The judicial inquiry came about because of several comments alleged
to have been made by Judge Bourassa in an interview with a journalist.
The comments suggested: (a) he believed that the degree of violence in
sexual assault cases in northern communities was less than in southern
communities; (b) he considered that rapes in the North tended to occur
"when the woman is drunk and passed out [and a] man comes along and
sees a pair of hips and helps himself';87 (c) he caricatured women who had
been sexually assaulted in Kingston, Ontario, as "dainty co-eds"; and
(d) he underestimated the violence of child sexual abuse when he
prefaced comments on breast touching and the fondling of genitals with
a "rightly or wrongly". Finally, the newspaper story reported that in a case
several years previously, Judge Bourassa based a sentence on his belief
that Inuit culture accepted that "when a girl begins to menstruate she is
considered ready to engage in sexual relations". The comments generated
widespread accusations of both racial and gender bias, a political storm,
and eventually a judicial inquiry.
Justice Conrad of the Alberta Queen's Bench conducted the Inquiry
into whether these allegations were founded and, if so, whether they
constituted grounds for the removal of Judge Bourassa from the bench.
While Conrad J. criticized Bourassa J. for his "carelessness", his "crude-
ness", his choice of language and his outspokenness,88 she found that the
conduct of the reporter was problematic, that contemporary events tended
to inflame the particular circumstances of this case (referring, for ex-
ample, to the Montrdal massacre) and that personal popularity is not a
precondition for judicial tenure.89
More important for the purposes of this analysis are the standards
which Conrad J. set for a determination of fitness and bias. Bias became
important in this case as it was understood to be one example of conduct
86. (10 October 1989), (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.) [unreported].
87. Re Inquiry Pursuant to 13(2) of Territorial Court Act; Re Inquiry into Conduct of Judge
Bourassa, [ 19901 N.W.T.R. 337 at 341 [hereinafter Bourassa Inquiry].
88. Ibid, at 348, 350.
89. Ibid. at 349.
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that was indicative of misbehaviour. In relation to fitness to serve Conrad
J. invoked an extremely high standard:
Are the comments so manifestly biased that, fairly determined in the light
of all the circumstances, they inevitably lead the public to attribute such a
defect of moral character to the judge that he would be seen to be unable
to discharge his duties in an impartial way; have they destroyed unques-
tioning confidence in his moral integrity and honesty of decision making,
thereby rendering him unfit for office?90
"Inevitably" and "destroying unquestioning confidence in his moral
integrity and honesty" are clearly higher thresholds than either "probabil-
ity" or "possibility". They represent standards of certitude. In relation to
actual bias, Conrad J., drawing upon Grantham's Case, also espoused a
very high test:
I understand partisanship to mean a conscious partiality leading a Judge to
be disloyal even to his own honest convictions. I understand it to mean that
the Judge knows that justice demands that he should take one course but
that his political alliance or political sympathies may be such that he
deliberately chooses to adopt the other. In such a case the moral element
undoubtedly enters into the definition of misconduct, and cannot be
excluded.9'
Again, the emphasis on ajudge's subjectivity, knowledge and conscious-
ness appears to establish an extremely high threshold. However, in
relation to apprehension of bias she modified the threshold to bring it
more into line with the Committeefor Justice92 case (i.e., an objective and
probabilistic test):
the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining
thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that
test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically
and practically-and having thought the matter through-conclude."93
Conrad J. was clear that given the high threshold there was no
possibility of finding actual or conscious bias "against natives, women,
northern Canadians, victims or intoxicated persons.. ." or bias "in favour
of accused persons."9'4 Indeed, to the contrary, she argued that "the
evidence was unequivocal that Judge Bourassa is a conscientious judge,
concerned with the culture and circumstances of the north."95 Nor did she
find a reasonable apprehension of bias which, as we have seen, appears
90. Ibid. at 345.
91. Ibid. at 344.
92. Supra note 56.
93. Bourassa Inquiry, supra note 86 at 345.
94. Ibid. at 344.
95. Ibid.
426 The Dalhousie Law Journal
to involve a somewhat lower objective and probabilistic threshold.
Carefully reviewing each of the allegations against Judge Bourassa, she
emphasized time and time again that the appropriate test was that of the
perception of a reasonable, right minded, and fully informed observer
who had all the facts available to her including, apparently, the judge's
subjective state of mind. When applied to the facts, Justice Conrad found
that this test had not been met. Thus, for example, in relation to the "pair
of hips" comment, Conrad J. found that a "reasonable person would"
realize that this was Judge Bourassa' s "opinion of how the offender views
women", not his own view;96 or, in relation to the characterization of child
sexual abuse as "fondling", she suggested that the "informed person
would" realize that "Judge Bourassa was repeating a word used by the
Crown prosecutor";97 or, again, in relation to the "rightly or wrongly"
prefatory comment, Conrad J. determined:
that a reasonable person would understand that Judge Bourassa was using
the phrase, as it is frequently used, to describe the reason something
happened, without commenting on it [sic] being right or wrong. It is a catch
phrase that has nothing to do with right or wrong. It does not indicate a
moral judgment. It is not a condonation of the action, nor does it indicate
a bias. 98
Clearly, then, the effect (if not the rhetoric) of this Inquiry has been to
set the standard for reasonable apprehension of bias at a fairly high level,
with the consequence that no apprehension of bias could be attributed to
the "careless" but "conscientious" Judge Bourassa. As was pointed out by
C6t6 J.A. in a related Northwest Territories case, Conrad J.'s report
"completely exonerated" Judge Bourassa.99
In contrast, the test of reasonable apprehension of bias as applied to
Sparks J. seems to be significantly lower. Consider, for example, the
difference between Conrad J.'s reasons for decision and those of Glube
C.J. Conrad J. carefully analyzed each of the allegations, filtered them
through the prism of the reasonable apprehension of bias test as she
understood it, and justified her conclusions. By way of contrast, Glube
C.J. perfunctorily reiterated a test and rapidly jumped to the conclusion
that a reasonable person might apprehend bias in Judge Sparks's com-
ments. This is a form of"I know it when I see it" legal reasoning, a method
which is unfortunately not uncommon in this area of law. Great slogans
can, sometimes, make bad law.t Instead of the appellate court invoking
96. Ibid. at 346 [emphasis added].
97. Ibid. at 347 [emphasis added].
98. Ibid. at 347 [emphasis added].
99. R. v. Doyle, [1992] N.W.T.R. 81 at 84 (C.A.).
100. P. Strauss, "The Myth of Colour Blindness" (1986) S. Ct. Rev. 99.
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its supervisory power in such a conclusionary way, a more robust analysis
might (in the spirit of Conrad J.) have asked the following types of
questions: Could it not be argued that practically and realistically the
reasonable, rightminded and fully informed observer would be aware of
the research'' indicating that not only is there some social consensus in
Halifax that police officers overreact when dealing with Black people,'l0
but also that there is widespread sociological and psychological evidence
to support the proposition that police officers sometimes adopt negative
attitudes and conduct towards members of the Black community? Could
it not be argued that Sparks J., rather than being potentially biased, is a
conscientious judge concerned with the culture and circumstance of
Halifax's Black community? Or, is the difference that because Bourassa
J. is White, male and Qudbec-born he cannot be seen to have any
particular stake in the outcome of decisions in the North, whereas Sparks
J., as a Black person, is presumptively partisan as soon as she even
mentions issues of race? 1'3 hi other words, might it be that despite the fact
that Glube C.J. invoked an "informed mind" test, in effect she applied a
"suspicious mind" test?
Indeed, a careful reading of her version of the test confirms that Glube
C.J. may be applying a lower threshold. Instead of directly quoting
precedent, she paraphrases it as whether a reasonable person "would
conclude that the judge's impartiality mightreasonably be questioned."'
"Might" is much closer to a possibility test, whereas as I have argued in
the previous section, the preferred trend is towards a probability test, i.e.,
more likely than not. 0 5 As I read Glube C.J.'s decision, my impression is
that she subjects any mention of race to a strict scrutiny test. That is, as
I shall argue in Part V1, a mode of analysis which is deeply suspicious of
discussions of race because of its commitment to colourblindness. The
problem with colourblindness is that it refuses to recognize that racial
designations and categorizations can have different significances de-
pending on the context. In other words, while strict scrutiny and suspicion
may be appropriate for certain situations where racialization is a variable,
they need not always be appropriate. I will develop these points in Parts V
and VI of this comment. But my main point remains that Glube C.J.'s
101. For a useful analysis ofjust how informed the "fully informed reasonable person" is, see
Ruffo, supra note 39 at 194-201.
102. Marshall Report, supra note 1 at vol. IV.
103. For an eloquent criticism of such analyses, see Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, supra
note 2, Higginbotham J.
104. R.D.S. #4, supra note 23 at 10 [emphasis added].
105. Note also that the Crown's factum advocates a "suspicion" test as outlined in R. v.
Campbell, (supra note 70) though Glube C.J. did not refer to this explicitly in herown decision.
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articulation of the test appears to be quite distinct from that of Conrad J.
and this has direct consequences for the conclusions reached.'0 6
Conrad J. emphasized that concerns about gender bias in the sentenc-
ing of a prominent member of the Inuit community by Bourassa J. were
outside her mandate as a Judicial Inquiry, but would be dealt with in
another forum, that is, in the form of an appeal. What is interesting about
the subsequent appeal decision in R. v. A. °7 is that there is absolutely no
mention of bias. The grounds of appeal filed by the Crown were silent on
the question of bias and focussed instead on issues such as aggravating
circumstances, breach of trust, rehabilitation and the principle of denun-
ciation. After a fairly lengthy decision discussing sentencing policies and
practices in the Northwest Territories the appeal was dismissed, with very
little reference to Bourassa J. Thus, not only has Bourassa J. been
"completely exonerated'' 0 5 but any concerns about bias have been
juridically erased. Judge Sparks, however, experienced no such judicial
106. A possible counterargument to the analysis offered here is that it is inappropriate to
contrast the Marshall and Bourassa J. situations with that of Sparks J. because the circum-
stances are so different. Sparks J. has been simply overruled on appeal whereas Bourassa J. and
the Reference Court judges faced possible removal from office. Accordingly, it can be argued
that it is appropriate to have a higher standard for a finding of bias in the removal context than
in an overruling context. Viewed in this light, a different standard need not constitute a double
standard.
While this argument has some potential merit I think that it is mistaken and can lead to some
curious results. If there are two different standards available to determine what constitutes bias
it could lead to the anomalous situation in which the same fact situation could generate two
seemingly incompatible determinations. Assume, for example, that a judge does make a
potentially racist comment and a party to the action decides not only to appeal the decision but
also to complain to the Judicial Council. If we adopt two quite different tests, a lower threshold
on appeal and a higher threshold in the complaint context, it could mean that the same statement
could be found to be biased for the purpose of the appeal, but not biased for the purpose of the
complaint.
A more appropriate approach would, in my opinion, apply the same test to determine if the
comment can be interpreted as racist. If the answer is "yes" to this first order question, this then
leads to a set of second order questions. Is the comment so racist as to justify a successful
appeal? Is the comment so racist as to justify removal from office?
This proposed two-tiered approach has the benefit of promoting consistency in determining
whether the comment manifests racial bias, while still allowing for flexibility in deciding what
to do about that bias. Consequently, on my proposed approach, there could be a determination
that a comment was racist, that the bias was such as to constitute the grounds for a successful
appeal, but not sufficiently serious to justify a removal from judicial office. Bias may be one
form of judicial misbehaviour, but not all misbehaviour renders a judge unfit to continue the
judicial function. Such an approach allows the legal system to acknowledge rather than deny
the possible existence of judicial racism and at the same time constructs a sliding scale of
possible remedies to deal with the problem of racism.
107. [1990] N.W.T.R. 36 (S.C.).
108. Supra note 87.
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solidarity."° The next three sections will suggest that this can be ex-
plained because of the deep seated differences in judicial method,
ideology and vision.
V. A Contextual Legal Method
One of the most disturbing things about R.D.S.#1 is the zeal with which
the Crown has pursued the appeal. What is it about the statements made
by Sparks J. that has provoked such an outcry and caused the Crown to
argue not just that there was an apprehension of bias, but also the very
unusual claim that there was actual bias?" I0 As pointed out in Part II, when
her comments are clarified Sparks J. seems to be making two points: first,
that on occasion police officers may mislead the court; and second, that
police officers sometimes overreact when dealing with Black youth. As
I read her decision, all that she was doing was locating the evidence
against the backdrop of this broader social knowledge."' In other words,
she was simply adopting a contextual legal method."I2
109. It is beyond the confines of this case comment to review the American law on judicial
bias. However, it is to be noted that there have been a series of cases in the United States where
Black judges have been challenged for bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias. See Blank v.
Sullivan & Cromwell, 418 F. Supp. 1 (1975); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, supra note 2;
Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 1017 (1981). Each
of these cases can be distinguished from R.D.S. on the facts as the challenges either referred
to the prior employment of the judge (e.g. lawyer for the NAACP) or for off the bench speeches
they have made to Black organizations, or for their general legal philosophy. It is to be noted
however that in every one of these cases the motions to recuse failed.
Furthe, txore, it woukt appear that it is oaly in egregious situatioems that White Ameican
judges are accused of or disciplined for racial bias. Compare Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984) with Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) and Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee,
637 F. 2d. 1014 (1981), U.S. Cert. Den. 456 U.S. 960; U.S. Reh. Den. 457 U.S. 1140. On the
basis of these authorities, if the overruling of Judge Sparks stands she will have the distinction
of being one of a select number of judges in North America since conquest to be officially
sanctioned for racial bias!
110. The Crown's factum is extremely adversarial, even hostile, to Sparks, J., unabashedly
accusing her of "racial bias" and "strong bias" against the police (at 14). It is to be noted that
the police chief, at least in interviews with the media, seems to have disagreed with the Crown.
Chief MacDonald is reported to have said, "Comments that create apprehension of bias don't
constitute real bias." B. Dorey, supra note 20.
111. As Rehnquist J. has phrased it, "proof that a Justice's mind at the time he joined the Court
was a complete tabula rasa ... would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias."
Tatum "j. Laird 409 U.S. 924 at 93S (,9712.
112. It is beyond the parameters of this comment to fully delineate the characteristics of a
contextual legal method. However, it is probably best understood in contradistinction to
abstractionism, the idea that legal rules have universal qualities and are relatively uncontami-
nated by the diversity of the contexts to which they apply. Contextualism, to the contrary,
acknowledges that legal rules are inherently indeterminate, that their meanings can be only
explored through an awareness of their impact in the diverse situations in which they might be
applied, and that these meanings may change as the various circumstances change. Most
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It can be argued that judges routinely and uncontroversially make
reference to issues of common knowledge. For example, Judge Bourassa
suggested that alcohol was often involved in situations of sexual assault.
Conrad J., in conducting the judicial inquiry wrote:
Judge Bourassa's comments with respect to persons being drunk is a
statement of his observation from his experience. An informed person
would learn that alcohol is frequently involved in sexual assault cases, and
Judge Bourassa cannot be faulted for saying so. Indeed, alcohol is involved
in many crimes, both in the north and the south, and Judge Bourassa is not
denying the involvement of alcohol in sexual assault cases in the south.'1 3
On the basis of this standard would an informed person really believe
that police officers never mislead a court and that judges should automati-
cally assume that an officer's interpretation of events is necessarily
accurate? Surely not. lI4 Consider, for example, the conduct of Sergeant
Maclntyre in the Donald Marshall Jr. prosecution, 5 or the fact that police
officers manufactured evidence in the Guy Paul Morin case." 6 Judge
Sparks's comment when taken in proper context was simply a rebuttal of
the Crown's strategy of encouraging prejudgment by pitting "a presump-
tively credible police officer against a presumptively dishonest ...
defendant."' 7 Only someone who has either a naively optimistic vision
of police officers... or a vested interest in securing judicial deference to
police officers' testimony could interpret this manifestly practical and
importantly for the purposes of this comment, a contextual approach encourages judges to
consider the broader social context as they apply and interpret legal rules. As ajudicial method
it has been discussed most explicitly by Wilson J. in R. v. Morgantaler (1988), 44 D.L.R. (4th)
385 at 483 (S.C.C.); and Edmonton Journal v. A.-G. for Alberta (1990), 64 D.L.R. (4th) 577
at 581-84 (S.C.C.); and L'Heureux-Dub6 J. in Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813; Young v.
Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3; and Willick v. Willick (1995), 173 N.R. 321 (S.CC). See also Vriend
v. Alberta (1994), 18 Alta. L.R. (3d) 286 (Q.B.).
113. Bourassa Inquiry, supra note 86 at 346.
114. See e.g., People v. Berrois 270 N.E. 2d 709 (1971); A. Dershowitz, The Best Defense
(New York: Random House, 1982) at xxi-xxii; and W. Stuntz, "Warrants and Fourth
Amendment Remedies" (1991) 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, for a discussion of warrants in the context
of police perjury, and some suggestions as to why police officers may be dishonest. See also
C. Steiker, "Second Thoughts on First Principles" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 870 at 853-54;
Mollen Commission, Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti
Corruption Procedures of the New York City Police Department (New York: The Commission,
1993); P. Hoffman, "The Feds, Lies and Videotapes; The Need for an Effective Federal Role
in Controlling Police Abuse in Urban America" (1993) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1455.
115. Marshall Report, supra note 1, at 37-43.
116. Professor Don Stuart reminded me of this example.
117. Stuntz, supra note 114 at 915.
118. See generally, McDonald Commission, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain
Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (Ottawa: The Commission, 1981); R. v.
Baylis (1988), 66 Sask. R. 268 at 284 (C.A.), acknowledging the possibility of intimidation or
coercion by the R.C.M.P.
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realistic statement as being biased. As a colleague has pointed out, if we
really thought that the police always told the truth, then we would not
need trials! "'9
Thus, I would suggest that it is the second statement that is at the core
of the Crown's allegation of bias. But again, is it really bias for a judge
to suggest that sometimes police officers overreact when dealing with
non-white groups? This is admittedly more controversial that the sugges-
tion that police officers sometimes mislead the court, but it is both
defensible and supportable. 20
The question of the relationship between the criminal justice system
and race has been the subject of extensive study' 2' in the United King-
dom, 22 and the United States,123 and some study in Canada. 124 On the basis
119. For a brief account of the fate of another non-traditional judge who, among other things,
was critical of police testimony, see D. Gibson & L. Gibson, Substantial Justice: Law and
Lawyers in Manitoba 1670-1970 (Winnipeg: Peguis Publishers, 1972) at 258-65.
120. Professor Black has suggested that I cite C.N.N.'s coverage of the Simpson trial and in
particular the racial prejudice of Detective Fuhrman. Others have suggested that I refer to police
beatings and shootings of visible minority citizens in Toronto, Montr~al, Los Angeles etc. Lest
these obvious sources be seen to be too anecdotal, what follows is a more scholarly, if brief,
review of some of the pertinent academic literature.
121. See e.g., L. Lewis & J. Gladstone, Racism in the Criminal Justice System: A Bibliogra-
phy (Toronto: Centre for Criminology, 1994); D. Baker, ed., Reading Racism and the Criminal
Justice System (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1994); M.P. Feldman, The Psychology of
Crime: A Social Science Textbook (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) at 92-95.
122. E. Cashmore & E. McLaughlin, eds., Out of Order? Policing Black People (London:
Routledge, 1991); T. Jefferson, "Race, Crime, Policing: Empirical, Theoretical and Meth-
odological Issues" (1988) 16 Int'l J. of Soc. of Law 521; "Symposium: Race, Criminal Justice
and the Legal System" (1989) 16 New Community 1.
123. C.R. Mann, Unequal Justice: A Question of Color (Bloomington: Indian University
Press, 1993); C. Owen & J. Bell, eds., Blacks and Criminal Justice (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1977); C. Steiker, "Second Thoughts About First Principles" (1994) 107
Harv. L. Rev. 820; "Symposium: Criminal Law, Criminal Justice and Race" (1993) 67 Tulane
L.R. 1725; "Symposium on the Impact of the Judicial System on the Status of African
American Males" (1994) 23 Cap. U.L. Rev. 1; "Symposium on Race and Criminal Justice"
(1994) 51 Washington and Lee L. Rev. 357.
124. Bellemare Rapport, Rapport du Comiti d'enquete sur les relations entre les corps
policiers et les minorities ethniques et visible (Montreal: la Commission, 1989); Law Reform
Commission of Canada, Report on Aboriginal Peoples and Criminal Justice (Ottawa: The
Commission, 1991); Symposium on Race Relations and Law (Vancouver, B.C.), Race
Relations and the Law: Report ofa Symposium Held in Vancouver, British Columbia, April22-
24, 1982 (Ottawa: Minister of State, Multiculturalism, 1983). There may be two reasons
conjectured for the poverty of Canadian research, the first problematic, the second controver-
sial. It may be that there is just not a great deal of scholarly interest in (or research support for)
studies on racism and the criminal justice system. Secondly, unlike the United States or the
United Kingdom, in Canada official statistics for crime do not include the categories of race
or ethnicity. One reason why this may be legitimate is that such figures can be used to construct
images of non-white communities as "crime prone". On the other hand, without basic empirical
data, it is more difficult to analyze police-non-white interactions. For accounts of police
releasing racially categorized crime statistics in the "Jane-Finch" area of North York, see The
Toronto Star (17, 24 February 1989).
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of "objective" criteria such as statistics on arrest,' 25 incarceration rates,' 26
and the application of the death penalty 127 the evidence is overwhelming
that "non-white" groups are disproportionately represented. 28 The ques-
tion of police interaction with "non-white" groups is somewhat more
difficult to get an angle on because it requires studies that cannot be
reduced to quantitative analyses. Thus the data are dependent more upon
observations and perceptions, and are therefore perceived to be some-
what "softer". With this caveat in mind, the vast majority of the studies
do indicate a more negative relationship between the police and "non-
white" groups than between the police and White groups. Race, it can be
said, frequently serves as a proxy for criminality.'29
Generally speaking the evidence can be grouped under two method-
ological rubrics: sociological research and psychological research. So-
ciological research attempts to assess perceptions of police-"non-white"
interactions. All studies in this regard indicate that "non-white" commu-
nities perceive themselves as being the victims of disparate police
attention and conduct.'30 Moreover the Marshall Inquiry has accepted a
125. "Minnesota Supreme Court Task Force on Racial Bias in the Judicial System" (1992)
16 Hamline L. Rev. 475 at 491-93; R. Reiner, "Race and Criminal Justice" (1989) 16 New
Community 5; Marshall Report, supra note I at 15 1, 191. It is to be noted, however, that in
relation to sentencing the Marshall Inquiry conducted a survey which indicated that race was
not a direct factor, though it did highlight other significant social variables. Ibid. at 191.
126. M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives in Canada: A Report of the Committee of the Canadian
Bar Association on Imprisonment and Release (Vancouver: The Association, 1988) at 83;
MarshallReport, supra note 1 at 150, 160; B. Meierhofer, "The Role of Offence and Offender
Characteristics in Federal Sentencing" (1992) 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 367 at 388-89; J. Kramer,
"Introduction" (1993) 67 Tulane L. Rev. 1725 at 1726.
127. D.C. Baldus, Equal Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis
(Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1990); F. Weatherspoon, "The Devastating Impact of
the Justice System on the Status of African-American Males: An Overview Perspective"
(1994) Cap. U.L. Rev. 23 at 46-50; Mann, supra note 123 at 202-03.
128. To the extent that there is debate, it tends to revolve around whether this overrepresentation
is intentional or systemic, overt or subtle, or whether other variables (e.g., class, demeanour)
are just as determinative as race. See Jefferson, supra note 122 at 527; Reiner, supra note 125
at 12.
129. M. Brown, Working the Street: Police Discretion and the Dilemmas of Reform (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1981) at 170; S. Johnson, "Race and the Decision to Detain
a Suspect" (1983) 93 Yale L.J. 214; "Development in the Law: Race and the Criminal Process"
(1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1472; T. Maclin, "'Black and Blue Encounters'--Some Preliminary
Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?" (1991) Val. U.L.
Rev. 243.
130. See e.g.,Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Ontario) (Toronto: Task
Force, 1989) at 152-59; Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 124 at 5; Marshall
Report, supra note 1 at 157; C. Ungerleider & J. McGregor, "Police Challenge 2000: Issues
Affecting Relations Between Police and Minorities in Canada" (1991) Cdn. J. of Criminology
555 at 558; A. Normandeau, "Police, Race and Ethnicity in Montreal" (1988) 4 Crimecare J. 3.
We Can't Go On Together with Suspicious Minds
report which acknowledges that many Nova Scotians, both Black and
White, believe that police officers discriminate against Blacks.'3'
Psychological research tends to be categorized as "police psychology"
and attempts to focus on police attitudes. 32 While some studies tend to
show that police officers have a higher level of racial intolerance than
many other members of society, 3  and others indicate that they have a
similar level of racial intolerance as the "normal" general public,'34 there
appears to be broad consensus that police officers tend to identify with
middle-class and White groups 135 and have a negative attitude towards
members of "non-white" communities.'36 Furthermore, the findings of
these types of studies seem to have been accepted by several recent
commissions that have studied police conduct, not only in the U.S.'37 but
also in Canada.'38
Thus, it can be argued that what Judge Sparks was doing was simply
articulating what a fully informed, reasonable person would know: that
racism is pervasive in Canadian society and that "practically and realis-
tically" police officers may be predisposed to overreacting when dealing
with Black youth. Nor has she been alone in acknowledging the context
of racialization. Other (White, male) judges have made similar com-
ments, apparently without censure. Doherty, J.A., speaking for a unani-
mous Ontario Court of Appeal, has recently acknowledged that:
131. Marshall Report, supra note 1 at 182-86, 259.
132. See e.g., C. Bartal & G. Bergen, "Introduction: Police Psychology and its Future" (1992)
19 Criminal Justice and Behaviour 236. Researchers in this tradition frequently caution that
there is no direct nexus between attitude and behaviour.
133. A. Neiderhoffer, Behind the Shield: Police in Urban Society (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday, 1967); A. Colman & L. Gorman, "Conservatism, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism
in British Police Officers" (1982) 16 Sociology 1.
134. D. Bayley & H. Mendelsohn,Minoritiesandthe Police: Confrontation in America (New
York: Free Press, 1969) at 145; MarshallReport, supra note I at vol. IV, 187; C. Ungerleider,
"Intercultural Awareness and Sensitivity of Canadian Police Officers" (1989) 32 Can. Pub.
Admin. 612.
135. S. Perrot & D. Taylor, "Ethnocentrism and Authoritarianism in the Police: Challenging
Stereotypes and Reconceptualizing Ingroup Identification" (1994) 24J. of Applied Soc. Psych.
1640 at 1651-52.
136. Jefferson, supra note 122 at 522; Reiner, supra note 125 at 7-8.
137. Report of the Independent Commission on the Los Angeles Police Department (1991)
at 69-75; "Report and Recommendations of the Florida Supreme Court Racial and Ethnic Bias
Study Commission" (1991) 19 Florida State U.L. Rev. 591; Minnesota Task Force Report,
supra note 125; "Report of the New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities (1992)"
reprinted in (1992) 19 Fordham Urb. L.J. 185.
138. Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Ontario), The Report of the Race Relations and
Policing Task Force (Toronto: The Task Force, 1989); Race Relations and Policing Task Force
(Ontario), The Report of the Race Relations and Policing Task Force (Toronto: The Task
Force, 1992); Review of Race Relations Practices of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force
(Toronto: Metropolitan Audit Department, 1992).
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[r]acism, and in particular anti-black racism, is part of our community's
psyche. A significant segment of our community holds overtly racist
views. A much larger segment subconsciously operates on the basis of
negative racial stereotypes. Furthermore, our institutions, including the
criminal justice system, reflect and perpetuate those negative stereo-
types. 
39
Niedermayer J., of the Nova Scotia Family Court, has been even more
candid:
[t]he issue of racism existing in Nova Scotia has been well documented in
the Marshall Inquiry Report ... A person would have to be stupid,
complacent or ignorant not to acknowledge its presence, not only individu-
ally but also systemically and institutionally.140
In Glube C.J.'s estimation, however, such an acknowledgement consti-
tutes an apprehension of bias!'4
In the next section I will suggest that this sharp difference in opinion
as to the appropriate judicial method can be traced to competing ideolo-
gies about the judicial role in a pluralistic democracy.
VI. Impartiality and Racial Identity:
Colourblindness or Colour Contextualism
Beyond the specifics of this particular scenario, the case also raises
fundamental questions about the nature of good judging in contemporary
society and the thorny issue of whether we should aspire to a socially
representative judiciary. It also asks us to revisit our conceptions of
equality and how they inform our understandings of appropriate judicial
decision-making. 142
For heuristic purposes, it can be said that there are two broad views of
the appropriate role of a judge, each of which is informed by a vision of
139. R. v. Parks (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d) 353 at 369 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied [1994]
1 S.C.R. x.
140. Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. S.M.S. (1992), 110 N.S.R. (2d) 91 at
109 (Fam. Ct.), aff'd (1992), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 258 (C.A.). See also Dartmouth/Halifax County
Regional Housing Authority v. Sparks (1992), 112 N.S.R. (2d) 389 (S.C.), rev'd on other
grounds (1993), 119 N.S.R. (2d) 91 (C.A.).
141. Some readers may be concerned that I have drawn too heavily on American materials
and that it is inappropriate to assume that the Canadian context is similar. Two responses are
available. First, I have referred to several Canadian studies and they confirm that there are
similar patterns in both countries. Second, we might be able to draw upon the environmental
legal standard of the "precautionary principle". That is, rather than assuming that racism in the
legal system is non-existent, until extensive research is available in Canada to indicate
otherwise, we should err on the side of caution and equality and recognize that there is a real
danger of racism.
142. See generally, Appointing Judges, supra note 4; and "Symposium on Judicial Election,
Selection and Accountability" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1555.
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equality: the formalists and the realists. The formalists have high hopes.
Their conception of impartiality is premised upon a formal conception
not only of equality, but also the judicial role. Formalists believe that the
judge is to divest him/herself of all preconceptions and identifications, to
discover and apply the relevant law as s/he finds it, and to treat everyone
the same without regard to race, class, gender or whatever.143 Themis
blindfolded is their icon, and equality before the law is their mantra.' 44
Realist judges are much more pragmatic in their outlook. They
recognize that both they and those who appear before them have contexts
and experiences that inform their understandings and their conduct. 41
Realists acknowledge that these admittedly complicating variables are
ineradicable and that rather than ignoring them, we should be conscious
of the possible implications-both positive and negative-of such vari-
ables. 146 From this perspective, impartiality requires both an awareness of
these contaminating factors 147 and empathy 48 so as to offset implicit and
taken for granted assumptions. 49
143. See, for example, the proposition that "a defendant is entitled to the cold neutrality of
an impartial judge... that no judge shall preside [where]... he is not wholly free, disinterested
impartial and independent." United States v. Orbiz 366 F. Supp. 628 at 629 (D.R.P. 1973). See
also M. Hoeflich & J. Deutsch, "Judicial Legitimacy and the Disinterested Judge" (1978) 6
Hofstra L. Rev. 769.
144. D. Curtis & J. Resnik, "Images of Justice" (1987) 96 Yale L.J. 1727.
145. For example, Cardozo argues that judges are shaped by
the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits
and convictions, which make the man [sic] .... The great tides and currents whichengulf
the rest of men do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by.
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921) at
167-68. Similarly, it has been suggested that "while an 'overspeakinig judge is no well tuned
symbol' neither is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming receptacle
for judicial power". Berger v. U.S., 255 U.S. 22 at 43 (1920), McReynolds J., dissenting. See
also R. Abella, "The Dynamic Nature of Equality" in S. Martin & K. Mahoney, eds., Equality
and Judicial Neutrality (Calgary: Carswell, 1987) at 3, 8-9.
146. Parks, supra note 139 at 353, 366; S. Abrahamson, "The Woman Has Robes: Four
Questions" (1984) 14 Golden Gate L. Rev. 489; Omatsu, supra note 4 at 144; J. Resnick, "On
the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1877.
147. R. v. MacKay (1980), 54 C.C.C. (2d) 129 at 156 (S.C.C.); R. MacGregor Dawson, The
Government of Canada, 4th ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963) at 435.
148. As Madame Justice Wilson has graphically stated, the judge must try to "enter the skin
of the litigant and make his or her experience part of [thejudge's] experience...". "Will Women
Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990) 28 Osgoode Hall L.J. 507 at 521. Or again, as Carter
J. has suggested, the "fact finder must 'walk a mile in the victim's shoes .... Harris v.
International Paper, 765 F, Supp. 1509 at 1516 (1991).
149. As Judge Jerome Frank has powerfully argued:
If... "bias" and "partiality" be defined to mean the total absence of preconceptions in
the mind of the judge, then no one has ever had a fair trial and rio one ever will. The
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In relation to issues of race, the formalists and the realists may have two
very different judicial philosophies. Formalists will incline towards a
"colourblind"'5 ° approach: the assumption will be that each person is an
individual and that racial identity (in the sense of skin colour) is an
irrelevant consideration, unless its specific relevance can be demon-
strated in a particular case. A classic example of such a position is to be
found in McCleskey v. Kemp in which the American Supreme Court
accepted the validity of statistics which demonstrated that in Georgia
murder defendants whose victims were White were four times more
likely to receive the death penalty than murder defendents whose victims
were Black, but held that this did not prove that McCleskey personally
had been the victim of racially prejudiced jurors."5 ' As part of the reasons
for reaching this result the Court suggested that if it were to acknowledge
racial prejudice in the context of death sentences, it would also have to
consider racism in other aspects of sentencing! 52
For realists, race matters.'53 They eschew colourblindness because
they recognize that racialization (in the sense of hierarchical social
relations on the basis of race) is still an extremely important social factor
and, therefore, that legal decision-making should always be sensitive to
the possibility that race is a variable.'54 Thus, facially neutral and
human mind, even in infancy, is no blank piece of paper. We are born with
predispositions; and the process of education, formal and informal, creates attitudes
in all men [sic] which affect them in judging situations, attitudes which precede
reasoning in particular instances and which, therefore, by definition, are prejudices.
Without acquired "slants", pre-conceptions, life could not go on.... The standard of
dispassionateness obviously does not require the judge to rid himself of the uncon-
scious influence of such social attitudes.
In addition to those acquired social value judgments, every judge, however, has
many unavoidable idiosyncratic "leamings of the mind," uniquely personal preju-
dices which may interfere with his fairness .... The conscientious judge will, as far
as possible, make himself aware of his biases of this character, and, by that very self-
knowledge, nullify their effect. Much harm is done by the myth that, merely by putting
on a Black robe and taking the oath of office as a judge, a man ceases to be human and
strips himself of all predilections, becomes a passionless thinking machine. [footnotes
omitted]
Re J. P. Linahan, 138 F. 2d 650 at 651-53 (2d Cir 1943). See also, Minow, supra note 9, for
an extensive elaboration of this perspective, as well as her more recent "Stripped Down Like
a Runner or Enriched By Experience: Bias and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors" (1992) 33
Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1201.
150. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 at 559 (1896), Harlan J., dissenting; over'd by Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 at 494 (1954).
151. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
152. Ibid. at 315-16.
153. C. West, Race Matters (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993).
154. "[O]ne should never automatically assume that racism and discrimination only
occurred in the past." Marshall Report, supra note I at 149.
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seemingly identical treatment may in fact be discriminatory because not
everyone is similarly situated and, therefore, the pursuit of equality may
require different treatment.'55 Realists do not repress questions of race,
they confront them. Viewed in this light, interpreting a sensitivity to the
racialized practices of Canadian society as bias only makes sense if one
is premising one's accusation on some underlying legal philosophy that
incorporates the myth of colourless individualism.'56 The difference,
then, between Sparks J. 's decision and Glube C.J.' s is that the former may
be a realist who is willing to contextualize issues of race whereas the latter
maybe a formalist who mistakes colourblindness for cultural neutrality.
To be clear, such a context sensitive and racially conscious judicial
method engenders the judicial obligation to judge, not prejudge.'57 It does
not mean that in every negative interaction between a White police officer
and a Black person the latter will inevitably be found to be credible.
Rather, it means that in applying the traditional assumption of innocent
until ploven guilty, judges should be aware of the lager social dyllamics
of a racially stratified society,'58 so that when charges are laid convictions
can only be imposed when the judge is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Black person is guilty. This is very different from the
position adopted by the Crown at the trial level which advocated a
presumption of guilt if a police officer says so! As Judge Jerome Frank
has argued, "[i]mpartiality is not gullibility [and d]isinterestedness does
not mean child-like innocence."'59 In short, by resisting the presumption
155. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 at 171, Mclntryre J.
156. T.A. Alienikoff, "A Case for Race-Consciousness" (1991) 91 ColumbiaL.R. 1060; D.
Greene, "Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance and the Myth of Colorless
Individualism in Bostick v. Florida" (1993) Tulane L. Rev. 1979; B. Flagg, "Was Blind but
Now I See: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent" (1993)
91 Mich. L. Rev. 953; N. Gotanda, "A Critique of 'Our Constitution is Colorblind"' (1991) 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1; D. Strauss, "The Myth of Colorblindness" (1986) Sup. Ct. Rev. 99.
157. R. v. Stark, supra note 44 at 68; Committee for Justice, supra note 56 at 391.
158. Parks, supra note 139 at 366-70. See also, s. 15(2) Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, Part 1 of Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11, s. 15(2).
159. Linahan, supra note 149 at 654. In the Canadian context Watt J. has argued that a judge
should approach his/her tasks "with a mind that is and appears to be open to reason and
persuasion, not with one that is empty of it and unschooled by experience."R. v. Bertram, supra
note 41 at 63. Along the same lines Watt J. has recently argued:
In everyday speech, "bias" is descriptive of a leaning, inclination, bent or predisposition
towards one side or another, or a particular result. In legal proceedings, "bias"
represents a predisposition to decide an issue or a cause in a certain way which does not
leave the judicial mind perfectly open to persuasion or conviction. Bias is a condition
or state of mind which sways judgment, hence renders a judicial officer unable to
discharge their duties in a particular case with the impartiality that is quintessential to
the judicial function. It generally refers to the mental attitude or disposition of the judge
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of police rectitude, Judge Sparks's decision manifests the virtues of an
open mind, precisely the standard that was outlined by the Inquiry
Committee of the Judicial Council in the Donald Marshall Jr. case:
True impartiality is not so much not holding views and having opinions,
but the capacity to prevent them from interfering with a willingness to
entertain and act on different points of view. Whether or not a judge was
biased, in our view, thus becomes less instructive an exercise than whether
or not the judge's decision or conduct reflected an incapacity to hear and
decide a case with an open mind.' 6
VII. What is Bias?
The previous sections have suggested that Glube C.J.'s decision is
mistaken for two reasons: first, it rejects a contextualist legal method; and
second, it is premised upon formalistic preconceptions of equality and the
judicial function. In this section I will suggest a third weakness in her
decision: an inadequate understanding of what bias might mean.
A major problem with the case law in this area is the unreflective way
in which judges have approached the very concept of bias. Usually it is
considered to be interchangeable with cognate concepts such as partial-
ity, prejudice, position, perspective, inclination, orientation, predisposi-
tion, leaning, partisan, antagonism, animosity, interest, favouritism,
connection, or engagement. However, such an exercise in literalist
towards a party-litigant, rather than any views that the judge may entertain regarding
the actual subject-matter of the dispute. R. v. Gushman, supra note 46 at para. 29.
Further support for the argument that Sparks J. was simply replying to the Crown's argument
in favour of priorizing a police officer's testimony can be garnered from a quotation she
reproduces in her supplementary reasons (which were excluded by Glube C.J.):
[o]nce found to be competent, every witness starts out on the same footing with equal
credit, although the accused has an enhanced position, ultimately because the burden
of proof is upon the Crown. In our system we have no feudal-like categorization of
witnesses, such that forexample, from the moment they take the stand, the lord has more
credit than the peasant, the educated than the illiterate, the propertied than the
impoverished or the man than the woman. Nor ought there be any unstated informally-
understood division, such that for example, entering the court room, the police officer
has more credit than the alleged speeder, be he or she a school principal or a student.
That is not to say that witnesses remain of equal credit throughout the proceedings, but
only that they begin on the same footing.
Emphasis added by Sparks J., quoting Hon. G. Seniuk, "Judicial Fact Finding and a Theory of
Credit" (1994) 18(3) Prov. Judges Journal 4 at 15. R.D.S. #3, supra note 21.
160. Report to the Canadian Judicial Council of the Inquiry Committee Established Pursuant
to Subsection 63(1) of the Judges Act at the Request of the Attorney General of Nova Scotia
(August 1990) at 26. This paragraph is omitted from the version of the report published in the
U.N.B.L.J., supra note 84. See also, Minow, "Stripped", supra note 149, at 1217; J.B.B. v.
J.A.B. (1992), 113 N.S.R. (2d) 60 (C.A.); R. v. St. Lawrence Cement, [1993] O.J. No. 1442
(Q.L.).
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reductionism oversimplifies the matter. As the discussion outlining the
differences between realists and formalists has indicated, the whole point
of judging is to take a position, to reach a determination that inevitably
favours one party and is detrimental to the interests of another. Moreover,
as I have suggested, it is not feasible (nor, in my opinion, desirable) to
expect judges to come to their tasks unencumbered with the messy
realities of their experiences. The core and ultimately unavoidable
problem in the law of judicial bias is to determine which biases or
prejudices or perspectives are legitimate and which are not."'6 And this is
a necessarily normative decision that cannot be avoided by facile formal-
istic reasoning. As Scalia J., (hardly the most progressive of judges'62) of
the U.S. Supreme Court has recently pointed out, even though there is
universal hatred for Adolf Hitler, it would not be accurate to say that
people are biased or prejudiced against him. For Scalia J., the pejorative
connotation of the words "bias" and "prejudice" require that an opinion
be "wrongful or inappropriate, either because it is undeserved or because
it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought not to possess ... or
because it is excessive in degree .... In short, an opinion must manifest
"a deep seated favouritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment
impossible".'63 In my opinion, nothing in Judge Sparks's remarks could
be considered to be undeserved or excessive in degree; nor could it be said
she ought not to possess knowledge of police-Black interactions, or even
that she has shown a deep seated favouritism or antagonism.
Glube's C.J.'s decision assiduously avoids such normative questions.
As I have pointed out previously, her discussion of the potentially
relevant law is perfunctory, and the extent of the reasoning negligible. But
the effect of such shoot-from-the-hip legal decision-making is to render
invisible by judicial fiat the reality of Canadian racism. The next section
considers several consequences that may result from such an approach.
VIII. Impact
Legal decisions can have consequences not only for the parties to a particular
case but also more generally. This is particularly true when a case like this
occurs in a province like Nova Scotia which has ongoing racial problems.
First, because of Glube C.J.'s decision, the youth in this case will have to face
a new trial. At least two years of his life will have passed in the shadow of
161. Parks, supra note 139 at 364; P. Cain, "Good and Bad Bias: A Comment on Feminist
Theory and Judging" (1988) 61 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1945.
162. City of Richmond v. Croson, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); "The Disease as Cure: In Order to
Get Beyond Racism, We Must First Take Account of Race" (1979) Wash. U.L.Q. 147.
163. Litekyv. U.S., 114S. Ct. 1147at 1155, 1157(1994).
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these legal charges. Moreover, the Crown will have a second opportunity to
better prepare its case; perhaps the Crown will call more than one witness.
Moreover, it should be noted that while it is usual in situations where a
reasonable apprehension of bias is found to order a new trial in front of a
different judge, the effect of doing so in this particular case is to ensure that
the next judge will be White because apart from Judge Sparks there are no
Black judges in Nova Scotia. In short, the effect, if not the intent, of
succumbing to the Crown's hardball tactic of alleging racially motivated bias
has been "judge shopping" on the basis of race.
Second, Nova Scotia's Black community is told in no uncertain terms
that their experiences and perceptions are of no legal weight, and that
even a Black judge cannot challenge the pervasive racism that continues
to saturate Canadian society.1" Empathy is trashed, 165 denial reigns
supreme, 166 and it is the police officer who is presented as the victim of
a racially hostile Black judge.
Third, the judicial community generally is affected by this decision.
Echoing several other cases where a reasonable apprehension of bias has
been found by an appeal court,167 Glube C.J. comments that "it would be
better if Judge Sparks had not made these comments". There are at least
two potential problems with such a lamentation. It tends to have a chilling
effect on lower-level judicial decision-making, discouraging judges from
"speak[ing] directly, even bluntly, so that there will be no misunderstand-
ing of what they mean." '168 Moreover, by dampening judicial candour
164. Parks, supra note 139 at 367-69.
165. For discussions of the relationship between empathy and objectivity, see K. Karst,
"Judging and Belonging" (1988) 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1957 at 1966; J. Webber, "The Adjudication
of Contested Social Values: Implications of Attitudinal Bias for the Appointment of Judges"
in Appointing Judges, supra note at 3, 24.
166. Glube C.J. is, of course, not alone in her seeming unwillingness to confront Nova
Scotia's racial problems. Perrot and Taylor, in their attempt to defend police officers from
accusations of being especially ethnocentric or authoritarian, do acknowledge that their
research indicates that the "police attribute the locus of negative relations to the community and
not to their own attitudes and actions." Perrot and Taylor, supra note 135 at 1655. Reiner has
identified a similar attitude among chief constables in England and Wales, supra note 125 at 8.
My research for this comment has made it abundantly obvious that, relative to the United
Kingdom and the United States, Canadian research on the issue of racism and the criminal
justice system is underdeveloped: ignorance is bliss. (It should be acknowledged, though, that
some work has been done in relation to First Nations people.) In the U.S. many state Supreme
Courts have taken the initiative and have established task forces to identify the problems and
to generate some possible solutions. See J. Resnick, "Revising the Canon" (1993) 61 Cinn. L.
Rev. 1197 Appendix I for a list of such task forces. Perhaps the time has come for Canadian
courts to take their heads out of the sand. For an overview of some of the American initiatives
see S. Scasnecchia, "State Responses to Task Force Reports on Race and Ethnic Bias in the
Courts" (1992) 16 Hamline L. Rev. 923.
167. See e.g. R. v.J.F.A. (1993), 82 C.C.C. (3d) 295 (Ont. C.A.).
168. Per MacEachern C.J. in Report of the Inquiry Committee, supra note 84 at 229.
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Glube C.J. seems to be implicitly suggesting that judges may think things,
but not say them.' 9 If this is the case, it runs counter to the ethical norm
of judicial openness. More generally, judges are put on notice that
decision-making should aspire to being ahistorical and decontextual and
that colourblind formalism is the appropriate judicial role.
Fourth, and finally, Judge Sparks has not only been overruled on
appeal, she has been disciplined. In effect, she has been told that she is not
to raise issues of race; that in donning her judicial robes she is to sever
herself from her community, that in taking her position on the bench she
is to forget her experientially informed knowledge, 70 and that she is to
adopt a neutral (a.k.a. White) role.'7 ' By conflating prior knowledge with
prejudice,'72 Glube C.J. has subordinated integrity 73 to assimilationist
conventionalism.'74 On a symbolic level, the decision seems to indicate
169. To be clear, my point is not that judges should be unrestrained in their statements. Rather
I would suggest that, like all of us, they should be self-reflective about their thoughts and
consider the possible effects of their statements. However, if after reflection a judge believes
that certain variables have had an impact on his/her decision, it is essential that the judge be
explicit as to what these variables are.
170. Such devaluations are not unprecedented. W. Wilbanks, The Myth of A Racist Criminal
Justice System (Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole, 1987) at 70 rejects the extensive American
literature on racism because it relies on "anecdotes, common sense scenarios, or statements
from authorities such as Black judges who assert that racism is pervasive in law enforcement."
171. For a review of arguments demonstrating the benefits of the appointment of minority and
female judges see S. Goldman, "Should there be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?" (1979)
62 Judicature 488; S. Martin, "Women as Lawmakers" (1992) 30 Alta. L. Rev. 738; C. Menkel
Meadow, "Excluded Voices: New Voices in the Legal Profession Making New Voices in the
Law" (1987) U. Miami L. Rev. 29; J. Resnick, supra note 146; C. Tobias, "Keeping the
Covenant on the Federal Courts" (1994) S.M.U.L. Rev. 1861; C. Tobias, "Increasing Balance
in the Federal Bench" (1995) 32 Houston L. Rev. 137.
172. Minow, "Stripped", supra note 149 at 1214.
173. P. Wald, "The Role of Morality in Judging: A Woman Judge's Perspective" (1986) 4
Law & Inequality 3.
174. Gotanda, supra note 156 at 53, 60. I wonder what Sparks J.'s response will be. It is worth
noting that in rendering her decision against disclosure of the tapes (a decision which was prior
to the Crown filing a notice of appeal) Sparks J. was clear as to the appropriateness of her
decision in favour of acquittal.
Tangentially, I point out here the courts have historically been critical of state agencies,
including police departments. Courts have also, I would suggest, been protective of
rights of all accused persons: rich or poor, Black or White. There have been, and will
continue to be, cases where courts will be critical of the Halifax Police Department and
its treatment of visible minorities as a group, a group which has historically been
subjected to discriminatory treatment in Nova Scotian society. Many would forcefully
argue that the judicial branch of government is the appropriate venue in which the
actions of police and other state agencies shall be subject to critical scrutiny.. There
have been, and no doubt will continue to be, cases where the courts, rightfully in my
view, examine and criticize when necessary the investigation of a police officer, and
equally so, if not more so, when the investigation is of a person from a group which has
historically endured discriminatory treatment in the justice system. There is no need to
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that while modest efforts may be made to diversify the judiciary, the
bottom line is that Black female judges should be seen, but not heard. 75
IX. Conclusion
The pursuit of a more inclusive and diversified judiciary requires a great
deal more than a marginal increase in the number of hitherto
underrepresented groups. Among other things, it requires a recognition
that principles and rules of law are themselves historically, culturally and
socially contingent and therefore in need of reconsideration and possible
reconfiguration.
The common law principle against judicial bias serves two connected,
but discrete functions. On an individual level, the principle ensures that
parties receive a fair trial. On a collective level, the principle promotes
public confidence in the judiciary and therefore reinforces the integrity of
the legal system.'76 But fairness and faith should not be conceptualized as
formalistic abstractions.'77 They can only be efficacious when located in
the context of contemporary Canadian society. In this comment I have
identified an extensive literature which indisputably confirms that there
are significant problems in police-Black interactions. A contextualized
approach to fairness cannot afford to ignore these realities, particularly if
we believe in innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Similarly, there is a widespread perception in Canadian society that the
legal system does in fact discriminate against members of "non-white"
communities. Thus, rather than promoting faith in the integrity of the
cite cases, however, suffice it to say this is one of the fundamental and necessary
functions of the judicial branch of government and a cornerstone of judicial indepen-
dence. For an exhaustive review of treatment of people of colour in the judicial system
see: The Royal Commission on the DonaldMarshall, Jr. Prosecution, Province of Nova
Scotia, December 1989, volumes 3 and 4, in particular.
R.D.S. #2, supra note 18 at 16-17.
175. There is, of course, a different vision:
In a society of diverse interests and competing values, impartiality is increasingly
understood not as a reflection of the status quo, but as a capacity to be genuinely open
to the pluralistic views and people Canada represents. No longer are the traditional
judicial attributes of knowledge, common sense, civility, and experience sufficient.
Judicial decision-making is not the mechanical application of law and the precedent to
sets of facts. The legitimacy of thejudges, and theireffectiveness in playing the complex
tasks we have assigned them, depend on the openness and fairness of their selection, and
on their sensitivity to the society which they serve and from which they come.
Appointing Judges, supra note 4 at 1.
176. Valente v. The Queen (1985), 23 C.C.C. (3d) 193 at 204 (S.C.C.).
177. R.v. Lippd, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 114 at 140-41; R. v. McAvena, [1987]4 WW.R. 15 (Sask.
C.A.), Bayda C.J.
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legal system, Glube C.J.'s decision can only do the opposite, 78 especially
when it is set in contrast to the "complete exoneration" of Judge
Bourassa 179 and the findings of "impartiality" on the part of the Reference
Court in the Donald Marshall Jr. case. 180
X. Addendum
While this comment was going to press, R.D.S. appealed the decision of
Glube C.J. By a majority the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal rejected the
appeal and upheld the ruling that there should be a new trial in front of a
different judge. 8'
The appellant advanced three arguments: first, that Glube C.J. inter-
fered with a determination of credibility by a trial court judge; second,
that Glube C.J. relied upon an inappropriate standard in articulating and
applying the reasonable apprehension of bias test; and third, that in
interpreting the reasonable apprehension of bias test Glube C.J. adopted
a formal equality approach rather than a substantive equality approach as
mandated by ss. 15, 11 (d) and 7 of the Charter. The majority decision,
written by Flinn J.A. and concurred in by Pugsley J.A., rejected all three
arguments. The dissent, written by Freeman J.A., seems to accept an
amalgam of the first two arguments, and does not explicitly address the
third argument, although it seems to adopt a more contextual approach.
The decisions reflect many of the themes previously identified in this
comment: inclusion and exclusion; realism and formalism; colour
contextualism and colourblindness; perspectivism and impartiality; and
comity and intolerance.
Flinn J.A. rapidly disposed of the credibility and Charter arguments.
With regard to credibility he simply asserted that Glube C.J.'s decision
"was not based upon a re-examination, and determination, of issues of
credibility".'82 In relation to the Charter argument, he avoided any
178. It might also be noted that Judge Sparks' situation may not be as unique as it seems. In
recent years, several Canadian women arbitrators have been challenged (sometimes success-
fully) on the basis of gender bias. At this point, I would venture to conjecture that what we may
be witnessing is an emerging pattern whereby women who are beginning to "make it" in the
higher echelons of legal bureaucracies are constructed as presumptively partisan, unlike the
generations of men who have been assumed to be neutral. For an overview of some of these
situations see Omatsu, supra note 4 at 144. See also S. Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War
Against American Women (New York: Anchor, 1992).
179. Supra note 87.
180. Supra note at 232. It should be remembered that a research study commissioned by the
Marshall Inquiry found that respondents were more concerned about the conduct of the courts
than the police! (Marshall Report, supra note I at vol. IV, 18, 27.)
181. R.D.S.v.R. (25 October 1995) C.A.C. #117036 (N.S.C.A.).
182. lbid. at 6.
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engaged discussion on the basis that it had not been raised at the lower
level. In spite of this, he opined that Glube C.J. "did not, in [his] view
apply an inappropriate equality approach in her consideration of appre-
hension of bias."' 83 In my opinion this suggests a strategy of confession
and avoidance. Flinn J.A. appears to be saying that he favours a
decontextualized, formalistic and sameness approach to the equality
provisions, but then says that it is unnecessary to pursue this because it is
a non-issue. However, he seems to be missing the point. Clearly, the
Charter angle could not have been raised at the trial level because bias
was not an issue. While he is technically correct to suggest that the
Charter analysis could have been raised in argument before Glube C.J.,
the point is that it was her reasons for decision that generated the
appellant's equality concerns. Moreover, other upper level courts have
exercised their discretion to allow Charter arguments to be raised for the
first time at the appeal level.184
However, as I have said, Flinn J.A. gave short shrift to the Charter
argument and focussed the bulk of his decision on the test for determining
whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias. Having invoked
several of the usual precedents and broad dicta from administrative law
scholars,' 85 Flinn J.A. identified five "essential ingredients of the test to
determine apprehension of bias." Only one of these is controversial, that
is, his suggestion that "there is no essential difference between the
phrases... 'reasonable apprehension of bias', 'reasonable suspicion of
bias,' or 'real likelihood of bias' .'1 6 While it is true that some courts have
attempted to elide the differences, as I have pointed out in Part III, many
other courts (including the House of Lords) have found that there are
significant differences. Persuasive legal reasoning would, in my opinion,
explicitly confront these competing lines of authority and attempt to
come to some resolution on the basis of either principle or policy.
Unfortunately, this is not the path chosen by Flinn J.A., although he does
add that "[s]urmise or conjecture is not sufficient; nor is the test related
to the very sensitive or scrupulous conscience".'87 For him, quite simply,
it is a reasonableness test. Thus, when Flinn J.A. applied the test, he too
found that Judge Sparks's comments indicated that she was considering
"matters not in evidence" in determining credibility, that her "unfortunate
use of... generalizations" denied the police officer any opportunity to
183. Ibid. at 14.
184. See e.g., R.W.D.S.U. Local 580 et al. v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573.
185. Supra note 181 at 6-10.
186. Ibid. at 11.
187. Ibid.
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address such concerns, and that he was therefore treated "unfairly." 1 8
Consequently, once again, and even more explicitly than in the decision
of Glube C.J., we encounter the process of constructing the White police
officer as the victim of an inequitable Black judge.
Finally, it should be noted that at one point the majority decision does
acknowledge the argument that police officers may manifest bias against
Black youth, but Flinn J.A. counters that while "[t]hat may very well be
so... it does not address the real issue here". 189 Yet again the inter-racial
dynamic that underlies this case is repressed.
In stark contrast the dissenting decision of Freeman J.A. opens as
follows:
The essential issue in this appeal is whether a trial judge gave rise to a
reasonable apprehension of bias in remarks made in the case of a fifteen
year old black youth apprehended by a white police officer on charges of
assaulting him .... 190
MreovTer, a few pages tater he contilues"
[t]he case was racially charged, a classic confrontation between a white
police officer representing the power of the state and a black youth charged
with an offence ... It is unfortunately true and within the scope of general
knowledge of any individual that police officers have been known to
mislead the court and overreact in dealing with non-white groups.' 9'
There is no attempt by Freeman J.A. to bury the race issue under layers
of precedent. Rather he quickly agrees with majority's articulation of the
relevant law, but disagrees with the way in which they applied the test:
"it was perfectly proper for the trial judge, in weighing the evidence
before her, to consider the racial perspective.' '192 For Freeman J.A., the
case is at bottom about when an appeal court may review a trial judge's
determination of credibility and on what basis? In contrast to the majority
decision which avoided the credibility issue and focussed on the objective
reasonable person, Freeman J.A. acknowledges the inevitable subjectiv-
ity of determining credibility. He advocates that like any other judge,
"Judge Sparks was under a duty to be sensitive to the nuances and
implications, and to rely on her own common sense which is necessarily
informed by her own experience and understanding."' 93 Here there is no
attempt to force a judge to deny her identity and experience; rather there
is an awareness that diversity of perspective is an attribute not a liability.
188. Ibid. at 13-14.
189. Ibid. at 13.
190. Ibid. at 15.
191. Ibid. at 18.
192. Ibid. at 16.
193. Ibid. at 18.
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But Freeman J.A. is careful not to allow a tolerance for perspectivism
to become a licence for ad hocery. He is clear that determinations of
credibility need to be supported by evidence and if they are not, they may
be reviewed by a superior court. However, as he reads Sparks J.'s reasons,
Freeman J.A. believes that she has provided sufficient grounds to support
her concern that the police officer may have overreacted, "enough to
justify her in tipping the scales in an assessment of credibility."'9 4
On this basis, Freeman J.A. then returns to the test of a reasonable
apprehension of bias. Again he reiterates the context:
Questions with racial overtones make the difficulties [of assessing cred-
ibility] more intense, yet these questions must be addressed freely and
frankly and to the best of the judge's ability. Because of their explosive
nature they are more likely than any others to subject the judge to
controversy and allegations of bias, but they cannot be ignored if justice
is to be done.'95
Because he is astute in recognizing that emotions can overflow in these
situations, he counsels caution and restraint (and perhaps even solidarity)
emphasizing that the standard for finding a reasonable apprehension of
bias is "high. . . it must be real".'96 Thus for Freeman, J.A. the comments
of Judge Sparks "would not cause a reasonable and informed person to be
apprehensive that justice was not being done."'197 And, unsurprisingly, the
views of this hypothetical reasonable person dovetail very closely with
Freeman J.A.'s own opinion that Judge Sparks's remarks are "more
consistent with a fair inquiry into delicate subject matter than suggestive
of bias on her own part.'1 98
Meanwhile, on the other side of town, R.D.S. prepared for the retrial
which was scheduled for five days later. This has now been adjourned
pending a leave to appeal application to the Supreme Court of Canada.
194. Ibid. at 20.
195. Ibid. at 20.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid. at21.
198. Ibid. at 20-21.
